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[Crim. No. 4714. In Bank. Sept. 30, 1946.]

THE PEOPLE, Rapondent, v. DONALD EDGAR KOENIG
et at, Defendant; WILLIAM RIOHTER, Appellant.
[On hearing after decision by the District Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Three, Crim. No. 3870 (72
A.C.A.602 [164 P.2d 923], reversing judgment of the superior eourt.
Judgment aftlrmed.]
[1] Oriminal Law-Bvidenc:e-OonfeB8ioDL-A oonfeasion is an

[2]
[3]

)
[4]

[6]

admission of guilt, and under Code Civ. Proe., § 1832, deftning
indirect evidence, the testimony of a witness that defendant
admitted guilt would seem to be direct -evidence that an admission or confeSBion was made by defendant, but circumstantial
evidence of the truth of what was admitted.
Id.-Evidence-OircumstantiaJ Bvidence.-Circumstantial evidence is as adequat<' to convict as direct evidence.
IeL-Instructions-Oircumstantial Bvidence.-Where circumstantial evidence is relied on by the prosecution, it is error to
refuse a requested instruction or to fail to include in the instruction given a proper statement of the principle that, to
justify a conviction, the facts or circumstances must not only
be consistent with the theory of guilt but must he inconsistent
with any other rational hypothesi!'.
Id.-Appeal-Harmleas and Reversible Error-InstructionaOircumstantial Bvidence.-ln a prosecution for robbery, the
erroneous failure ot give an instruction that, to convict defendant on circumstantial evidence. the circumstances must be
inconsistent with any reasonable theory of innocence, did Dot
constitute ground for reversal where such error was not preju.
dicial and did not result in 8 misearri~ of ;justice.
Witnesses-Determination of Oredibflity-&ight to DiBrelard
'l'eatimon,..-In a prosecution for robbery, it wu DO ground to
disregard the testimony of policE' oftiCE'rs. wit'h 1'eIIpeCt to eer-

[1] Confession as circumstantial evidence, note. 40 A..L.ll 4'Tl.
See, also, 8 Oa1.Jur. 106: 20 Am.Jur. 416.
[3] Instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal case, note,
89 A.L.tt. 1379. See. also, 8 Oal.Jur. 371: 53 Am.Jur. 574.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 458; [2] Criminal
Law, § 585; [3] Criminal Law, § 894; [4] Criminal Law, § 1432;
[5J Witnesses, § 292; [6] Criminal Law, 1691; (1] 0rimiDa1 lAw,
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cODversationa, that ODe or the other may have incorrectly
recalled the time when the allp,a-ed statements by defendant
were madt'o
[6] Criminal Law-IDstructioM-CautioDa17-AdmissioDS.-In a
prosecution for robbery, where the prosecution relied on evidence of defendant's ora) admiasion of guilt, an instruction to
view such evidence with caution should have been given in view
of Code Civ. Proe.• ~ 2061, suM. 4, but the failure to give the
instruction was not ground for reversal where it was improbable that, bad such instruction been given, the jury would
have discounted the testimony to such an extent that it would
have returued a different \'erdiet.
[7] Id.-Evidene&-DeclaratioDi 01 One of Several Defendants.In a prosecution for robbery, where the trial court admonished
the jury, at the time a poliee officer was testifying with regard
to a conversation with a codefendant, that it could consider this
conversation only u affecting laid codefendant, no substantial
error resulted from the court'. failure to admonish the jury
again at the time said etat.em.lt was read to the jury.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County and from an order denying a new
trial. Arthur Crum, Judge. A!lrmed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Leola Buck Kellogg and Monttomery G. Rice for Appellant.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

TRAYNOR, J .-Defendants William Richter, Donald Koenig and Ralph Hagenios were jointly charged with two counts
of robbery while armed with a ,-nolver. Defendant Hagenios
pleaded guilty. Appellant Riehter and defendant Koenig were
tried by a jury and convicted They appealed from the judgment and from orders denying their motions for a new trial.
Koenig failed to perfect his appeal, and it was dismissed.
Shortly after midnight of May 21, 1944, defendant Hagenios,
armed with a .38-ealiber revoh,ft, entered a cafe in West
Los Angeles and robbed the proprietor and a customer who
was cashing a pay check. According to the testimony of a
witness. HageniOl'l escaped from tbe scene in a green eon[6] See 8 OalJur. 305; 63 ADJw. 48L
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vertible car, which W8.b immediately driven away as he
stepped into it from the right side. This witness was unable
to see the drivel' of the car. There was no eyewitness testimony at the trial linking appellant Richter with the robbery.
Richter and Bagenios were employed by the Veterans
Administration in W8frt Los Angeles, Riehtel' was ehief
cook, and Hagenios worked under his supervision. The propl'ietor of the restaurant had been cashing pay ehecb for
10 years and kept money on hand for this purpose. Two
years before the robbery appellant had lived next door to
this restaurant for six months.
On May 22, 1944. defendant Richter and Hageni08 were
arre.<rt.ed in a hotel room in Ocean Park, California, where
they were registered under fictitious nameR after their return from San Francisco together on May 19th. It was not
established whether appellant knew that they were 80 registered. At thill time appellant had a home in Los Angeles
with his wife, who was out of town at the time of the robbery.
At the time of the arrest, the police found in the hotel room,
forty-nine .38-caliber cartridge.~ and a cartridge box that had
contained fifty cartridges. At the time of the robbery, Rage..
nios fired one shot that lodgEd in the wall of the cafe.
The victim of the robbery testified that HageniOA took
$1,915, including the amount of the customer's pay check.
When Hagenios and Richter were arrested they had $232
and $278. respectively. on their persons.
Police Officer Suber!l testified that he was one of the arresting officerI' and that when the cartridges were found in the
hotel room. Hagenios told him that they were his, and that
appellant at that time denied any knowledge of the robbery
and stated that the $278 in his possession was derived from a
sale of his automobile and a loan of $100, both negotiated
before his trip to San Francisco, and $90 he won there on the
races. Subel'!l also testified that appel1ant and Bagenios were
lodged in the West LOA AngeleR jail, where on the night of
!\fay 23d he had a convel'!!ation with the two prisoners and that
during this conversation Police Officer Ward was present
and that during the last part of the conversation Poliee
Officer King was present.
Subers testified that in the course of this conversation he
advised the defendants that he had a good case against them
and asked if they would plead guilty. He also requested their
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cooperation in recovering the rest of the money. At this point,
aecording to the witness, Hagenios denied getting more than
$780, which included the money in appellant's and Hagenios' possession, $220 that had been given to Koenig,
and money that had been spent. Appellant stated that
"That was all they had gotten." The witness testified that
Richter also said that he had given "Koenig $120 as his
share of the job" and that "they [Hagenios and Richter] had
picked" up the car used in the robbery "at a drive-in place
at Wilshire and Santa Monica Boulevard"; that appellant
said that he drove the car and abandoned it after the robbery one block east of St. John's Hospital in Santa Monica.
Police Officer Subers also testified to a later conversation
at which Richter, Hagenios, Koenig, Officer King, and he
were present. He asked defendant Koenig if he was sure
that the $220 received from the other defendants was just
a loan and appellant "spoke up and said, 'I gave you .120.00
and it wasn't a loan.'"
Police Officer King testified that he did not reeall the first
conversation to which Subera had testi1ied, but that he was
present at the second conversation after Koenig was brought
in. He stated that he asked Koenig and Hagenios to "tell us
about the robbery and Hagenios spoke up and said that all
three were involved in the robbery, and that Richter had
that Richter at 1irst denied this "and
driven the car .
then Hagenios said, 'You are into this as well as we are, and
we are not going to take the rap for this alone; ...
At
this point, according to the witness, appellant admitted that
he drove the car. The rem of Officer King's testimony so far
as it related to Richter, concerned the latter's description of
the car as a green convertible and his admissions that he
knowingly participated in the robbery, which the three of
them had planned. The admissions as to the acquisition and
disposition of the car were substantially the same as those
Subers testified were made at the 1irst conversation.
Police Officer Ward was not called to testify. Police Officer
Burham testified that he received instructions on the night
of May 23d to look for an automobile one block east of
St. John's Hospital, and that he and his partner went
to that location and found a· 1937 La Salle green convertible that was on their list of stolen cars.
Appellant testified that the money in his possession at the
time of his arrest was what remained after his San Francisco
<

•

";

t..

..

;

~

I

Sept. 1946]

)

/

PEoPLE tI. KOENIG
[29 C.24 " ; 11.1 • .24 1]

91

trip of the money received from the sale of his ear, a $100
loan, and $70 that he won in San Francisco on the races. He
denied admitting guilt or making the statements attributed to
him by Officers King and Subers and stated that he heard of
the robbery for the first time when he was arrested.
[1] Appellant contends that all the evidence against him
was circumstantial and that the trial court failed properly to
instruct the jury with regard to circumstantial evidence.
Whether all t.he evidence was circumstantial depends OIl
whether the testimony as to appellant's admissions was direct
or circumstantial evidence. In other jurisdictions evidence of
oral confessions is direct and not circumstantial evidence.
(See 40 A.L.R. 571; note L.R.A. 1917D 595 and 73 U.Pa.L.
Rev. 317; Underhill Criminal Evidence (4th ed., 1935) § 4.)
Research has failed to reveal any ease holding otherwise, except
Damas v. People, 62 Colo. 418 [163 P. 289, L.R.A. 1917D 591].
which was expressly overruled in Mitchell v. People, 76 Colo.
346 [232 P. 685. 40 A.L.R. 566]. Section 1832 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, however, defines indirect evidence as
". . . that which tends to establish the fact in dispute by
proving another, and which, though true. does not of itself
conclusively establish that fact. but which affords an inference
or presumption of its existence. For example: a witness proves
an admission of the party to the fact in dispute. This prove.c;
a fact, from which the fact in dispute is inferred. ,. A confession is an admission of guilt (People v. Connelly, 195 Cal.
584 [234 P. 374]), a fact in dispute. Under the statute, the
testimony of a witness that the defendant admitted guilt would
seem to be direct evidence that an admission or confession
was made by defendant but circumstantial evidence of the
truth of what was admitted. [2] Whether or not all evidence of oral confessions or admissions must be considered
as circmnstantial evidence under section 1832, we will assume, for the purpose of this ease, that all of the evidence
against appellant was circumstantial. That assumption does
not lessen the weight of the evidence, for circumstantial evidence is as adequate to convict as direct evidence. (People v.
Latona, 2 Cal.2d 714 [43 P.2d 260]; 1 Jones, Commentaries
on Evidence, 16-25; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, § 926.)
The trial court instructed the jury that "There are two
classes of evidence recognized and admitted in courts of justice, upon either of which juries may lawfully find an accused
guilty of crime. One is direct evidence, which is the direct
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testimony of any eyewitness. Such evidence may consist of
any act, declarations or circumstances admitted in evidence
tending to prove the crime charged or tending to connect
the defendant with the commission of the crime.
"If upon consideration of the whole case you are satisfied
to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt of the
guilt of a defendant, you should so find. irrespective of whether
such certainty has been produced by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence in the degree of
proof required for conviction but only requires that the jury
shall be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence of
either the one character or the other, or both."
The judge also instructed the jury that, "If the evidence in
this case M to any particular count, is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to
be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of a defendant, and the other to his innocence, it is your duty, under
the law, to adopt that interpretation which will admit of such
defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to his
guilt." Appellant makes no objection to the general instruction but contends that the special instruction on evidence
susceptible of two interpretations was not complete and that
the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction offered by appellant. [3] The requested instruction read,
"In order that a jury may be warranted in finding a defendant guilty on circumstantial evidence, all the facts and circumstances necessary to establish the conclusion of guilt must
be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, all such facts and
circumstances must be consistent with each other and with
the conclusion sought to be established, which is that the
person on trial committed the crime as (".barged. All such
facts and circumstances, must be inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the innocence of the defendant, William
Richter, and such facts and eireumstances, taken all together,
must be of such conclusive and satisfactory nature as to produce in the minds of the jurors a reasonable and moral certainty that the person on trial, William Richter, and not
some other person, committed the offense charged."
The requested instruction was improperly refused. In
People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8], the defendant
was convicted on circumstantial evidence alone under an inItruction substantially identical with the one given in the
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present case. It was held (27 Cal.2d 175} to be the duty
of the trial judge, on his own motion, to include in the instruction a statement that ". . • to justify a conviction, the
facts or circumstances must not only be entirely conllistent
with the theory of guilt but must be inconsistent with any
other rational conclusion." Such an instruction is required by
the weight of authority if all the evidence is circumstantial.
(See 89 A.L.R. 1378.) Although the requested inmruction
deals with other matters, it properly stateR the principle of
the interpretation of circumstantial evidence. The statement
that the jury must find that "William Richter, and not some
other person, committed the offense eharged"might have
been left out. There were adequate instructions on the nature of the offense, however, and the jury could not have
been confused by this statement.
The failure either to give the requested instruction or to
include in the instruction given a proper statement of the
principle that the evidence must be inconsistent with any other
rational hypothesis was error. ['1 It does not follow, however, that error in this regard necessarily requires reversal
of the trial court. In the Bender case, it was held that the
failure to give a complete instruction was not prejudicial
under the facts in that ease. Similarly in the present case such
failure was not prejudicial. It is true that in People v. &If/ol,
65 Cal.App.2d 462 [150 P.2d 812], the court held that the
failure to give the complete instruction was prejudicial, but a
conviction in that case involved the state's proving that the
defendant knew that she had participated in an act of sodomy
although she was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
at the time, and the evidence was confined almost entirely to
her participation. The jury could reasonably have concluded
that defendant was not a knowing participant in the act. In
People v. Hatchett, 63 Ca1.App.2d 144 [146 P.2d 469], the
court also held that the failure to give the complete instruction
was error, but it did not reverse on this error alone but on
this error and several other errors that were substantial.
[5] Appellant contends that the testimony of the two p0lice officers WaR so contradictory as to be unreliable, and that
the other evidence, under the circumstances, was insufficient to
RUstain the conviction. It is true that there were certain inconsistencieR between the testimony of the two officers in regard to who was present at the two conversations and as to
whether certain statements were made by appellant at one
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time or another but these discrepancies were not substantial.
As to the admissions that they testified were made by appellant, the two witnesses were in accord. Certainly it is no
ground to disregard such testimony that one or the other
may have incorrectly recalled the time when the alleged
statements were made.
[6] Section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, subsection 4, provides that on all proper occasions the jury is to be
in...tructed "That the testimony of an accomplice ought to be
vieweil with distrust, and the evidence of the oral admissions
of a party with caution." No such cautionary instruction was
given by the trial judge nor was one requested. It was formerly
the rule that even the refusal to give such an instruction was
not error on the ground that the instruction amounted to a
mere commonplace statement of what every jury was believed
to know. (People v. Raber, 168 Cal. 316 f143 P. 317].) Later
the code section was held unconstitutional as authorizing comment on the evidence. (Hirshfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142 [223
P. 451].) In People v. Vail, 22 Ca1.2d 642 [140 P.2d 828],
the Hirshfeld case was overruled, and it was held that the
section was never unconstitutional. In the DaB case an instruction was given directly contrary to the section with
respect to the testimony of accomplices. No admissions were
involved. In Conger v. White, 69 Cal.App.2d 28 [158 P.2d
415], such an instruction with respect to admissions was requested and refused. The court held this refusal to be prejudicial error in view of the equivocal nature of the admissions
relied upon. The admissions in the instant case, if true, were
far from equivocal. In view of the code section, however,
such a cautionary instruction should have been given. In
view of the record in this case, however, it is improbable
that had this instruction been given, the jury would have
discounted this testimony to such an extent that it would
have returned a different verdict.
[7] Appellant contend~ that a written statement signed
by codefendant Koenig containing matters that tended to
implicate appellant was received in evidence without the trial
court's properly limiting its application solely to Koenig. The
record shows, however, that when Police Officer Subers was
testifying with regard to a conversation with Koenig, the court,
at the suggestion of appellant's counsel, admonished the jury
that it could consider this conversation only as affecting
Koenig. Later this statement was read to the jury without
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further admonition, and none was requested. At the close of
the People's case, the statement was offered in evidence as an
exhibit solely against Koenig. The trial court instructed the
jury that "Any statement you may find to have been made by
any defendant after the commission of a crime, if you find a
crime to have been committed, may be considered by you 8.<;
evidence affecting, if it does affect, only the defendant who
may have made such statement and not as ati'ecting any other
defendant." Under these circumstances no substantial error
resulted from the failure to admonish the jury again at the
time of the reading of the statement.
The jury was fulJy instructed as to reasonable doubt and
in regard to the credibility of witnesses in general and was
told, in effect, that it must bring in a verdict of not guilty if
there was any reasonable interpretation of the evidence that
pointed to innocence. After careful examination of the record,
we must conclude that the errors either alone or in combination, did not interfere with the substantial rights of the
appellant or result in a miscarriage of justice.
The judgment Ann order Are afflrm<,d.

.\

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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